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The objective of this study is to outline the mediating role of János Esterházy in the 
bilateral relationship of the two countries. The limited length only allows a summary 
with a few examples. In the second half of the paper, the activity of Esterházy in the 
Jewish question will be tackled.
In 1939, Slovakia had three neighbours: Germany, Hungary and, until 
September, Poland. The territory of Slovakia was 38,000 square kilometres with 
a population of 2.6 million. Slovaks formed 85% while the rest was made up of 
Hungarian, German, Rusin (Ruthenian) and other minorities.1 The country was to 
serve the role of a model state, an example for Central and Southern Europe, in the 
plans of Nazi Germany. Model state status meant submission to German demands and 
the possibility of political sovereignty in return. The head of state was Jozef Tiso. At 
first, Slovak propaganda tried to create the illusion for their citizens that their country 
was a neutral state, like Switzerland, between Germany, Hungary and Poland. In 
reality Slovakia lost her independence almost immediately after her separation from 
Czechoslovakia. On 23 March 1939, she signed a defence treaty (“Schutzvertrag”) 
with Germany, in which the German Reich guaranteed her independence for 25 years 
1  The composition of the society was as follows: 2,260,894 Slovaks (85.11%), 128,347 
Germans (4.84%), 77,488 Czechs (2.92%), 69,106 Ruthenians (2.6%), 57,897 Hungarians 
(2.18%), 28,763 Jews (1.08%), 26,265 Roma (0.99%), 3,848 Poles (0.14%) and 0.14% others. 
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and Slovakia undertook close cooperation with the German government, and the 
organisation of her military force in cooperation with the German defence forces. 
Slovakia also gave her consent to the creation of the “Schutzzone”,2 which comprised 
5% of her territory. The treaty gave the possibility for Germany to gradually gain 
control over the national economy of the country, and to get involved in Slovak 
domestic policy. This was the situation when János Esterházy began his political 
career and became an important figure in the Slovak-Hungarian relations.
In 1939, and later during WWII, minority affairs were handled as strictly 
domestic issues both in Slovakia and Hungary, and any initiatives or criticism in their 
interest from outside were regarded as violation of the sovereignty of the state while 
both states endeavoured to support their own ethnic minorities abroad as efficiently 
as they could. Slovak-Hungarian relations were based on mutual distrust and they 
were full of tensions due to the minorities. The tensions were fuelled by the fact 
that the situation of Slovaks in the territories ceded to Hungary deteriorated and the 
same applied to Hungarians living in Slovakia. The Slovaks mainly criticised the 
“Hungarization” in education and the weakening of the Slovak national movement.3 
Hungarians in Slovakia complained about the reduction of their minority rights. The 
minority question facilitated the worsening of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries in 1939–1942. The Hungarian government was even considering breaking 
diplomatic connections with Slovakia, but it was prevented by Germany.4 Therefore, 
the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary was far from the usual friendly 
attitude that could be expected from allies. Both parties tried to raise distrust in the 
Germans towards the other.
While Slovakia regarded the regain of the territories lost by the First Vienna 
Award as her primary objective in foreign policy, Hungary wanted to retain them at 
2  The territory of the Schutzzone formed a 30–40-km wide region along the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia from the Polish to the former Austrian border. Only German barracks 
could be present here.
3  D. ČIERNÁ-LANTAYOVÁ, Podoby česko-slovensko-maďarského vzťahu, 1938–1949, 
Bratislava 1992, pp. 12–13.
4  On this question see I. JANEK, Diplomáciai csatározások a magyar-szlovák kapcsolatokban 
1940–41 között, in: Kutatási Füzetek 12, Pécs 2005, pp. 165–179.
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any rate. Minority affairs were of secondary importance. Oddly, even though Slovakia 
and Hungary were members of the same alliance, their interests clashed both in 
political and economic fields. Neither Slovakia nor Hungary could disregard German 
wishes that each country in the Axis bloc must avoid conflicts among each other; 
however, they did not keep it in their bilateral connections. Slovakia’s becoming 
a sovereign, almost homogeneous nation state meant that an old dream came true, 
and it was the celebration of Slovak national consciousness. The Vienna Award 
shocked Slovak intellectuals with similar intensity as the Trianon treaty had done 
the Hungarians. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks got now to Hungarian territory, 
and the fear of their assimilation immediately raised revisionist ideas in Bratislava. 
The Vienna Award caused disappointment and disillusion in Slovak society. The 
Slovak government began to work on the realization of reciprocity.5 They monitored 
Hungarian diplomatic manoeuvres and tried to gather evidence against Hungary to 
gain the favour of Germany. Esterházy had to play a mediating role between the two 
governments in this uneasy atmosphere.
János Esterházy considered the forging together of the Hungarian minority 
his main task. He imagined their life as a great family. As the president of Magyar 
Párt (Hungarian Party) he regularly visited Hungarian towns and villages and tried 
to remedy the complaints of the people. He also played an instrumental role in the 
development of bilateral connections and diplomatic talks in 1939–1944. His opinion 
was asked in every important question both by Slovak and Hungarian politicians, 
and he also mediated between the two countries. He maintained good relationship 
with leading circles in both states, and he regularly met with foreign diplomats 
accredited to Bratislava. He visited the Hungarian and German embassies weekly, 
reported about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and asked for 
their assistance. He also travelled to Budapest on a regular basis, where he spoke up 
for both the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovakian minority in Hungary. 
Although Esterházy’s role in the Slovak-Hungarian relations was essential those days 
5  M. VIETOR, Dejiny okupácie južného Slovenska 1938–1945, Bratislava 1968, pp. 53–55; 
M. HETÉNYI, Zjednotená Maďarská strana na Slovensku 1939–1945, Nitra 2011, p. 231.
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he was a merely tolerated member of the Slovak legislation.6 He spoke, on behalf of 
the Hungarian Party in parliament, several times on issues that could not appear in the 
press and were not mentioned by the Slovakian government. He listed the grievances 
of the Hungarian minority, as he pointed out in one of his speeches, because they lack 
any other forum, and because the censorship deleted his words in the press. It was not 
infrequent in those years that Hungarian-language papers in Slovakia were printed 
with a half-empty front page because the censorship crossed out the rest in the last 
moment.
The leader of the Hungarian Party and an MP, Esterházy was a prominent 
figure in Slovakian public life. He never hesitated to openly express his views. He 
was said to be the voice of remorse of Slovakia because he remarked everything that 
the government wanted to cover.
Esterházy spoke in defence of the Hungarian minority several times. In his speech 
in parliament on 21st July 1939, he outlined the shortcomings of the constitution. He 
pointed out the lack of constitutional guarantees for legal equality: “the Slovak nation 
[...] must not regard us Hungarians inferior in any respect, and must not violate our 
equal status. [...] Who establishes a state must hold it important that the state will not 
be an artificial construction but will last for centuries.”7 Esterházy revealed abuses of 
the Slovak authorities in his speeches. He emphasised the interdependence of the two 
nations and tried to decrease the tensions between them. His mediating intention is 
noticeable in the following case. From 10th April 1939, an anti-Hungarian propaganda 
campaign began in Slovakia, which manifested itself in politicians’ speeches and 
media programmes. An important element was the demand to regain the territories 
6  The Slovak administration thought that if a Hungarian representative is given a seat in the 
Slovak parliament, then a Slovak representative will be present in the Hungarian parliament 
one day. The Hungarian administration never gave a seat to the Slovak minority all through 
the war. Therefore, Esterházy worked with gradually decreasing legal possibilities and 
decreasing influence in Slovakia in 1939–1944. He became merely a tolerated person in the 
Slovakian legislation, and they tried to waive his immunity referring to various violations of 
law several times. See: I. MOLNÁR, “Sem gyűlölettel, sem erőszakkal…” Esterházy János 
élete és mártírhalála, Komárom 2008, pp. 197–198.
7  I. MOLNÁR (ed.), Esterházy János: A kisebbségi kérdés. Válogatott írások, beszédek, 
interjúk, Budapest 2000, pp. 146–147.
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lost in the First Vienna Award.8 The idea of St Stephen’s state was challenged with 
the notion of Great Slovakia and Great Moravia.9 At first the radio and the press 
attacked the Hungarian minority, later political leaders joined with their speeches. 
“The press called the Hungarians murderers, the Hungarian gendarme blood-thirsty 
beasts,”10 which shocked Slovakian public shortly after the military clashes (Little 
War).11 The Slovak government reproached the Hungarian authorities for insulting 
several Slovak minority activists and explaining it with the notion of reciprocity. 
These were responses to the arrest of leading Hungarian intellectuals in Slovakia. 
Reciprocity had become the basis of bilateral connections by that time. Esterházy 
emphasised Christian and humanistic values, and he condemned both reciprocity 
and the abuses of the authorities. “If here in Slovakia, an ultra-chauvinist Slovak 
considers to serve the interest of his country the best by tearing the party badger off 
a Hungarian in Nitra, Bratislava, Prešov or Baňska Bystrica, or by offending his 
nationality, then this ultra-chauvinist Slovak harms his country in the same way as 
the ultra-chauvinist Hungarian who verbally or physically endeavours to obstacle 
the national development of Slovaks in Hungary.”12 On 12th May 1939, Esterházy 
called his fellow party members in his speech in a party assembly in Bratislava 
to abstain from provocation, and he also criticised the Hungarian government’s 
8  The Slovak Republic rejected the First Vienna Award and the borders drawn according to it 
from the beginning. I. MOLNÁR, Esterházy János, Dunajská Streda 1997, p. 86.
9  In their view Great Slovakia would include the territory lost with the First Vienna Award 
as well as the territory with Slovak population in Moravia. They wanted to deport Jews, 
Hungarians, Czechs and the Roma from these places and bring home the Slovaks from the 
USA, and thereby create a strong homogeneous ethnic majority which could withstand 
the Czech and Hungarian ambitions. The response to the Hungarian propaganda, which 
emphasised the thousand-year history and cultural superiority, was also born: the Slovak 
version claimed that advanced culture flourished in Pribina’s realm when the Hungarians 
softened meat under their saddles on the steps of Asia. “Why are they always bragging with 
Saint Stephen; Cyril and Methodius were much greater”, the Slovak propaganda said. Some 
Slovak politicians demanded Vác, Eszergom and Miskolc.
10  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (hereinafter MNL), Külügyminisztérium (hereinafter KÜM), 
K-63, 456. csomó. 51/pol. 1939. sz.
11  In connection with the “Little War” see: I. JANEK, Az elfelejtett háború, in: Történelmi 
Szemle, 43, 3–4, 2001, pp. 299–313.
12  Esti Újság, May 14, 1939, pp. 1–2.
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limitation of cultural and association activity of Slovaks in Hungary.13 He pointed 
out the interdependence of the two nations several times. At one such occasion he 
said: “In my view, the little nations in the Danube basin must work in partnership, 
especially in the present warlike atmosphere, in order to keep their sovereignty and 
ensure peace in the Danube basin, or, if you like the Carpathian Basin. […] I have 
never concealed my opinion in the nationality question: every nation or nationality 
has the right to fulfil a complete national life even if it has no separate sovereign state. 
As a conclusion, I have the principle that Slovaks in Hungary must get everything 
they are entitled to as a nationality.”14 He went on to explain that he could not give up 
the Hungarian minority rights which they had obtained in the Czechoslovak Republic 
through tough struggle, and which they retained in the separate Slovak state.
Esterházy’s main objective was to get ties between Slovakia and Hungary 
closer, and this was a focal point in his negotiations in Budapest and Bratislava. The 
following case is an example for this. Esterházy visited President Jozef Tiso in early 
July 1939, and he explained the objection of the Hungarian government to the fact 
that the Slovak government had done nothing to extend the rights of the Hungarian 
minority. Esterházy was willing to continue talks in order to improve the bilateral 
connections. He thought that the Hungarian government would be open to dialogue 
if Tiso had informed them about his intentions and plans through him. Esterházy 
also made it clear that Hungary had no territorial demands towards Slovakia.15 Tiso 
welcomed this declaration and said that he personally always wanted to see the 
development of friendly relationship between the two countries. Had he known what 
border modifications were to happen, he would have come to an agreement about 
the territories with the Hungarian government in Komárom.16 He thought it likely 
that in that case they could have signed economic, cultural and political contracts 
with Hungary in early 1939. “That was the mistake I made,” Tiso said,17 but he 
13  Slovenský Národný Archív (hereinafter SNA), Ministerstvo vnútra, Box 15, 5499/1939.
14  SNA, Snem Slovenskej repuliky, Príloha k tesnopiseckej zpráve o 21. zasadnutí Snemu 
Slovenskej republiky v Bratislave 21. decembra 1939, p. 46.
15  MNL, K-64. KÜM, 89. csomó. 1940–65 tétel. Document without number, 6th July 1939.




reproached the Hungarian government for not handling the Slovaks in the way as it 
was promised in the Kosice speech of Regent Nicholas Horthy.18 The Slovak public 
opinion became anti-Hungarian due to the atrocities between November 1938 and 
July 1939, and that is why he, Tiso, did not initiate the improvement of relations, 
as he would have prepared the way to his resignation. He suggested to Esterházy 
that the two governments should start economic negotiations, which could give the 
opportunity for secret talks and for cultural and political agreements in the back of 
the Germans. He would guarantee that Slovakia would have no exaggerated demands 
and that they would ask in the interest of the Slovak minority as much as it would 
be acceptable for Hungary. In the end, Esterházy promised Tiso that he would report 
everything to the Hungarian foreign minister.19 Although no political agreement 
was made between Slovakia and Hungary in 1939 regarding the minorities, smaller 
export-import decisions were realised, that is, Esterházy’s mediation was not totally 
futile, but he could not achieve a breakthrough.
The following case reveals the fact that Esterházy was criticised from the 
Slovak side for his talks. Slovakian MP Konstantin Čulen criticised Esterházy by 
saying that he travelled to Budapest too frequently, and also the policy of Hungary 
towards Slovakia. As a response Esterházy gave a speech in the Slovak parliament 
on 7th May 1940. He admitted that he visited Budapest on a regular basis and he met 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister as well. He commented on it with these 
words: “I go when I feel that a problem needs solving. I also add, because I am not 
boastful, that we did not talk with the mentioned gentlemen on questions of great 
politics, and we did not talk about how the map of Europe will change after the war, 
but I do work in the interest of the non-registered Slovak railwaymen and postmen 
and the like, and if there should be somebody who would question the credibility of my 
word, I will show written evidence about how many Slovak government official had 
regained his existence through my intervention.”20 Esterházy explained that he was 
18  Miklós Horthy and his escort marched in Kosice on 11 November. He gave a speech in 
Slovakian with Croatian accent, in which he welcomed the Slovaks in their new home. The 
Hungarian radio broadcast his speech. He promised legal equality for Slovaks and Hungarians.
19  MNL, K-64. KÜM, 89. csomó. 1940–65 tétel. Document without number, 6th July 1939.
20  MNL, K-63. KÜM, 459. cs. (Esterházy’s speech in the Slovak parliament), (7th May 1940).
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dedicated to the idea of friendship with the Slovaks and he also declared it from the 
beginning of his career.21 “[...] I would like to believe that these are only temporary 
symptoms, and the policy of understanding will prevail here as well, which lies on the 
principle of ‘live and let live’.”22
On 22nd July 1941, Esterházy spoke up for the Hungarian minority in the 
Slovakian parliament in the debate on the establishment of the propaganda office. 
He mentioned that it had been a long time since he last spoke and continued: “I am 
of the opinion that in such troublesome times, the minority ought not to turn to the 
public with all its grievances. We have informed the appropriate government offices 
about their wishes and complaints, and I am convinced that they will be remedied 
with good will. Therefore, I do not want to deal with the memoranda submitted to 
the government too early.” He went on to express his astonishment in connection 
with the propaganda issues which were held so important by the government: “[...] 
why does the official have to seal the radio sets of Hungarian people and adjust them 
in a way that they are unable to take Budapest?” Esterházy, while his speech was 
accompanied with remarks shouted in, called such arrangements narrow-minded, 
and he raised doubts about the equal rights of the minorities in Slovakia. “[...] we 
Hungarians complete our duties as citizens and we expect the appreciation of this 
in return; because we will not let every petty official handle us as he pleases.” In 
the rest of his speech, he criticised the voices of the Slovak propaganda against the 
Hungarian minority and against Hungary, which intensified tensions rather than 
decrease them: “because we must live next to each other on this continent no matter 
what we do.”23 He received the response of the presidency of the Slovak government 
to his letter to Jozef Tiso and to his speech in parliament on 31st July 1941. Some of 
his complaints were admitted and the rest was rejected with reference to Act 95 of the 
constitution, the law of reciprocity. Both the memorandum and the response to it were 
21  Új Hírek, May 9, 1940, pp. 1–2.
22  SNA, Snem Slovenskej republiky, Tesnopisecká zpráva o 34. zasadnutí Slovenského 
snemu, 7th May 1940, pp. 22–26.
23  SNA, Snem Slovenskej republiky Tesnopisecká zpráva o 67. zasadnutí Sloveského snemu, 
22nd July 1941, pp. 19–20.
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then forwarded to the embassy of Germany.24 Esterházy also presented his complaints 
to the Hungarian government, which forwarded them to the German embassy, too. 
The German foreign ministry admitted that Esterházy was right and promised their 
mediation. On 7th August 1941, Matuš Černák, the Ambassador of Slovakia in Berlin, 
informed the foreign ministry in Bratislava that the German government wished to 
stop the anti-Hungarian tone in the Slovak press, because the debate could imply that 
the anti-Bolshevist front, led by Germany, was not united. This had a temporary effect. 
The Slovaks started collecting articles from the Hungarian press and showed them as 
evidence in Berlin that the Hungarians began the affair. This case can illustrate what 
difficulties Esterházy had to face in his mediating activity, and also that the last word 
in Slovak-Hungarian problems was said in Germany.
Esterházy never gave up the idea of reconciliation between the two nations, 
which is indicated in the following case. The president of Slovak National Unity Party 
in Hungary, Emanuel Böhm met with Slovakian Minister of the Interior Alexander 
Mach in Bratislava in April 1942. The president informed the minister about the 
improvement in the situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary, and asked him to 
show understanding towards the Hungarians in Slovakia because it will positively 
affect the situation of Slovaks in Hungary.25 Esterházy had talked with Böhm several 
times before. Mach listened to Böhm and received Esterházy in April 1942, when they 
discussed all topical questions regarding the Hungarians. As a result, the pressure on 
the Hungarians in Slovakia decreased for a while, and the same applies to the Slovak 
minority in Hungary. The Slovakian press adopted a milder tone and they wrote about 
the improvement of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Mach and Esterházy met several 
times. An important stage of this development was that Hungarian Prime Minister 
Miklós Kállay allowed Slovenská Jednota to become a daily from 24th May 1942, in 
which Esterházy played an instrumental role.26 It was clear for Esterházy that the days 
of nationalist minority policy were over. He spoke in the interest of the Slovaks in 
24  SNA, Ministerstvo zahraničných vecí, Box 130, Number 555/41.
25  MNL, KÜM, K-63, Box 462, Number 68/1942 (24th April 1942).
26  Our source for the circumstances of the publication and the content of Slovenská jednota is: 
J. SPIŠIAK, Spomienky z Budapešti 1939–1944, Bratislava 2010, pp. 269–272.
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Hungary, which had a positive effect on the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia. He 
and his party worked as a link between Slovakia and Hungary, and it facilitated the 
improvement of the conditions of the minorities.
On 24th July, János Esterházy visited Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach 
and asked him to modify some protocols that were against the interest of the Hungarian 
minority. Mach responded that he could not fulfil the request as Premier Vojtech Tuka 
had asked him not to make any change in connection with the Hungarians without 
consulting him before. He also mentioned to Esterházy that the Hungarian authorities 
had prevented the political organisation of the Slovaks around Košice and they did not 
even allow cultural performances. Tuka himself ordered the Slovakian ambassador in 
Budapest, Ján Spišiak, to watch such cases and to protest at the Hungarian authorities 
immediately, and also report the case and the Hungarian response to Bratislava, if 
he hears about any disfavourable arrangements. Tuka insisted on the principle of 
reciprocity in the cases of the Slovak minority in Hungary.27
Esterházy, after studying the cases reproached by the Slovaks, confirmed the 
abruptness of the Hungarian authorities to the Slovak minority around Kosice. He 
disagreed with this behaviour, which is harmful mostly to the Hungarian minority 
in Slovakia and therefore he urged the quick solution of the problems.28 He wrote 
to the Hungarian foreign minister the following day, in which he asked him to send 
an investigating committee to Košice. He knew that there were some people in the 
Hungarian authorities who were unfamiliar with the local mentality and disliked the 
Slovaks. He thought that although the Slovak complaints might exaggerate, there was 
some truth in them, so a committee should be sent there. He asked that state secretary 
Tibor Pataky should be the leader of the committee.29 In his report to the Foreign 
Ministry of 26th August 1942 that Ambassador Spišiak explained the reduction of 
articles that criticised the policy of Slovakia with the activity of Esterházy. He was 
also pleased to see that the Hungarian revisionist propaganda became less intense.30 
27  MNL, K-28, Miniszterelnökség (hereinafter M. E.), Box 6, 128/pol. 1942 (24th July 1942).
28  Ibidem.
29  MNL, K-28, M. E. 200. cs. 379. tétel, Number E-23638 (25th July 1942).
30  SNA, MZV, Box 124, Number 9671/1942.
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Meanwhile Esterházy met with Slovak ministerial advisor Štefan Semián, who 
informed him confidentially that the strict attitude of the Slovak authorities to the 
Hungarian minority was the consequence of the advice of the Slovak ambassador 
in Budapest, Ján Spišiak. With this behaviour, the ambassador wanted to get the 
Hungarian authorities to show friendlier attitude to the Slovak minority.
Esterházy was working on the improvement of the situation of minorities 
during nearly the whole war period. Although his personal talks brought visible 
improvement occasionally, he could not achieve significant development in the 
relations of the two countries. He was of the opinion that the Slovaks in Hungary must 
receive their minority rights, and it was not his fault that the Hungarian government 
did not modify its policy regarding the minorities. The interdependence of the two 
nations makes it a historical necessity to forgive each other’s former crimes, but the 
principle of reciprocity prevented the development of closer friendship between the 
two nations.
The Problem of János Esterházy and the Jewish Question
It is very difficult to present this problem clearly as it has been thoroughly infiltrated 
with political ideologies. There is some pressure on both Slovak and Hungarian 
historians to take a stand on this issue. Hungarian authors write about him with 
appreciation as the critic of totalitarian regimes, an oppositionist, who has become 
a symbol, a hero and a martyr. As all symbols, he is not easy to define and can be 
subject to different interpretations. From the Hungarian point of view, he has become 
the victim of the Beneš decrees, which is a painful issue for the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia up to the present day. Note that Esterházy could have escaped in 1945, but 
he remained as he did not feel himself guilty. The myth of a hero is also represented 
in Esterházy’s courage to declare his opinion in the question of the deportation of 
Jews and being the single one to vote against it in the Slovakian parliament. Still, 
the Hungarians have failed, so far, to get the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem to 
give him a title for the rescue of the Jews. In Slovakia, he has not been rehabilitated, 
nor has the Hungarian minority been compensated for bearing the collective guilt. 
Esterházy was sentenced to death as a war criminal after WWII. This was, as it 
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were, the condemnation of him and the whole Hungarian minority in Slovakia. 
The Czechoslovak nation state needed an individual in whom the crime could be 
manifested and who could be punished as the main figure of the guilty nation. For 
all this, Esterházy has become an example in the eyes of the Hungarians in Slovakia.
For the Slovaks, on the other hand, Esterházy has become the embodiment of 
Hungarian irredentism. He was regarded as a war criminal, a collaborator, a fascist 
politician who cannot be rehabilitated. If he was quitted, the Slovakian public opinion 
and Slovak historians would have to admit that what happened to the Hungarian 
minority after WWII was illegal and unfair. The role of Esterházy is interpreted 
differently in Slovakia and Hungary.
The problem of Esterházy and the Jewish question has not yet been studied 
at depth. In Hungary, Imre Molnár and others have dealt with this issue, while on 
the Slovak side Ladislav Deák, Ivan Kamenec and Eduard Nižňansky have studied 
the Jewish question; Deák and Kamenec also researched Esterházy’s activity. 
A monograph on the life of Esterházy and his role in the Jewish question should be 
written by Slovak historians. Russian, Czech, Israeli and German archives can also 
provide new unknown material.
The Solution of the Jewish Question in Slovakia
The first Jewish laws were passed in Slovakia as early as the second half of 1939. 
Jews were obliged to wear the yellow star, then they were deported to labour camps.31 
Nearly 10,000 Jewish shops and companies were eliminated or sold to Slovaks.32 In 
1939, besides those of Israelite religion, people who converted to Catholicism after 
1918 and those who had at least one Jewish grandparent or a Jewish spouse were 
counted as Jews. The allowed number of Jews was maximized in several professions. 
As a result, approximately 6,000 Jews lost their jobs. In the Germans’ opinion, 
Slovakia began the elimination of Jews quickly and efficiently. After a while, however, 
the German leaders thought that the initial impetus weakened as the deportations 
31  D. KOVÁČ, Bratislava 1939–1945, Bratislava 2006, p. 172.
32  On the Aryanization in Slovakia see: I. GRAZIANO – I. EÖRDÖGH, Jozef Tiso és a 
szlovákiai holokauszt, Budapest 2006, pp. 51–93.
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did not start immediately and many Jews remained in their homes.33 The German 
ambassador in Bratislava, Hans Bernard shared this view. In his memorandum 
of 22nd July 1940 he remarked that the “solution” of the Jewish question had not 
been completed and that Jews were still considered valuable and essential citizens 
in Slovakia. He asked Berlin to send advisors to investigate this problem.34 Slovak 
leaders negotiated with the Germans on the Slovakian Jews several times but they 
did not as yet come to any decision. Interestingly, the Slovaks gave their consent 
to the deportation of Jewish Slovak citizens in Germany as early as 2nd December 
1941 but they wanted their property.35 From this point the next step for the Germans 
was to demand the deportation of Jews in Slovakia. The most active mouthpieces of 
anti-Jewish measures were Vojtech Tuka and Alexander Mach. On 9th September 
1941, Act 198/1941, the so-called “Jewish Codex” came into effect, which was based 
on the Nuremberg laws and aimed at the “final solution” of the Jewish question.36 
The Jews were deprived of their citizen rights, they were required to declare their 
properties above the value of 5,000 Crowns, upon which a property tax of 20% was 
imposed. Jewish landholding was confiscated, their typewriters were taken away and 
the Jews had to provide winter clothes for Slovak soldiers on the front. 1888 firms 
were also confiscated and given to Slovaks and collaborators. The private property 
of 54,667 people in the value of 4,322,238 Crowns was confiscated or purchased by 
Slovak owners at a low price.37
In October 1941, the relocation of the Jews in Bratislava began. 6,000 out of 15,000 
were sent to labour camps in the country.38 The rest received immunity for a while as it 
turned out that many had professions whose lack would strike Slovak economy heavily. The 
Slovaks wanted to be eminent in the eyes of the Germans and they did their best to eliminate 
33  Ľ. LIPTÁK, Príprava a pribeh Salzburských rokovaní roku 1940 medzi predstaviteľmi 
Nemecka a Slovenského štátu, in: Historický Časopis, 13, 3, 1965, p. 359.
34  J. KAISER, Die Politik des Dritten Reiches gegenüber der Slowakei. Ein Beitrag zur 
Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Satellitenpolitik, Bochum 1969, p. 600.
35  SNA, fond MZV, kt. 594, without number. Also: E. NIŽNASKÝ, Holokaust na Slovensku, 
Vol. 4, Bratislava 2003, doc. 27, pp. 111–112.
36  MOLNÁR, Sem gyűlölettel, p. 177.
37  Ľ. LIPTÁK, Slovenko v 20. Storočí, Bratislava 1998, p. 208.
38  SNA, fond Policajné riaditeľstvo, Box 2228, 21457–4.
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the Jewish population. The fact that a part of the Slovakian Jewry had pro-Hungarian 
sentiment may have strengthened this process. Most of the Jews adhered to Hungarian 
language and culture after Trianon, and many did so after 1942.39 The Slovaks might also 
fear that at a possible referendum the Jews might vote for unification with Hungary.
The German government always encouraged the deportation of every Slovakian 
Jew from the second half of 1941. Talks about this took place in Hitler’s office on 
23rd–24th October 1941 with the participation of Tiso, Tuka and Mach. Hitler thought 
that the Slovakian government was “incapable of solving this problem on its own”.40 
Mach said later that Hitler had explained that Germany needed the Jewish labour force. 
The leader of the SS, Heinrich Himmler thought that the Slovakian Jews should be sent 
to labour camps in Poland. According to another memoir Hitler threatened the Slovak 
government at another meeting in early 194241: “If Slovakia rejects [the deportation of 
the Jews], they can expect the worst from me.”42 The intimidated Slovakian parliament 
handed in a proposal for the deportation of the Jews on 15th May 1942. Then the Ministry 
of the Interior declared the Jews to be enemies of the Slovak nation. This would provide 
some legal basis for the deportations. The bill of the “constitutional law on the deportation 
of the Jews” had four articles. The first said that Jews had to leave the territory of the 
republic; the second deprived the Jews of their citizenship; the third was on the property 
of the relocated Jews; the fourth said that the act would come into effect on the day of its 
declaration. Mach said that with the approval of this act Slovakia has got rid of all the Jews. 
He also pointed out that it was only an outline law and asked for permission to execute the 
first two points by decree as difficulties might appear during its implementation. When 
asked about the costs of the deportations he said that all expenses would be covered from 
the Jews’ wealth.43
39  R. L. BRAHAM, A magyarországi holokauszt bonctani vizsgálata: az okok egy lehetséges 
magyarázatra, in: R. L. BRAHAM (ed.), Tanulmányok a holokausztról, Vol. VI, Budapest 2014, p. 364.
40  SNA, Národný Súd, Box 53, Number 41/782.
41  The source is based on memories; the Germans could really put pressure on the Slovaks, but 
it is hard to prove when exactly this happened and whether he visited Hitler. E. NIŽŇANSKÝ, 
Nacizmus, holokaust, slovenský štát, Bratislava 2010, p. 111.
42  L. ESTERHÁZY, Szívek az ár ellen. Népek ütközése, közép-európai tapasztalatok, 
Budapest 1991, p. 121.
43  SNA, fond Snem Slovenskej republiky, Box 180, 370/1943.
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The Slovak Ministry of the Interior designated several “transfer camps” for the 
Jews in Bratislava, Szered, Poprad and Žilina. The commanders of the camps were 
instructed to organised the transport of the Jews and give them over to the Germans 
over the border. In Slovakia, the collection of the Jews was done by the Hlinka Guard 
on the order of the government. The first group of Jews left Poprad on 25th March 
1942 and crossed the Slovak-German border in the morning of 26.44 Slovakia was the 
second country to implement the deportation of Jews after Germany. The anti-Jewish 
laws affected about 89,000 people, 4% of the Slovakian population.45 The Jews lost all 
their incomes and properties before they were sent to extermination camps in Poland in 
spring 1942.46 The initial steps were taken under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Dieter Wisliceny, who represented Adolf Eichmann.47 It is noteworthy that Slovakian 
Jews had been taken to camps in the German Reich even earlier but those actions lacked 
any legal basis. A clear act was needed, which regulated the deportations. This was 
Article 68 in 1942, which elicited the protection of the Vatican.48 The Vatican Secretary 
of State Cardinal Tardini wrote in one of his letters: “It is unfortunate that the president 
of Slovakia is a priest. Everyone understands that the Holy See cannot stop Hitler. But 
who understands that it cannot restrain a priest?”49
Eventually most Slovakian Jews were arrested, put in ghettos then deported in 
cattle-trucks to concentration camps in the German Reich.50 The greatest beneficiary 
of the “Aryanisation” was the Slovak state.51
44  NIŽŇANSKÝ, Nacizmus, p. 119.
45  The deportation of the Slovakian Jews started already in March 1942 and it lasted until the 
end of the year.
46  I. KAMENEC, Slovenský štát (1939–45), Praha 1992, pp. 107–108.
47  K. HRADSKÁ, Prípad Dieter Wisliceny. Nacistickí poradcovia a židovská otázka na 
Slovensku, Bratislava, 1999, p. 30.; T. TÖNSMEYER, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 
1939–1945. Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn, München, Wien, 
Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, pp. 137–138.
48  The Vatican protested at Slovakian ambassador Karol Sidor against the limitation of 
possibilities and the deportation of Jews and converted Catholic Jews on 14th March 1942. I. 
KAMENEC – V. PREČAN – S. ŠKORVÁNEK (ed.), Vatikán a Slovenská republika (1939–
1945). Dokumenty, Bratislava 1992, pp. 72, 92.
49  KOVÁČ, pp. 218–219.
50  KAMENEC – PREČAN – ŠKORVÁNEK, pp. 97–98.
51  I. GAUCSÍK, Lemorzsolódó kisebbség, Bratislava 2013, p. 59.
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On 5th October, the German embassy in Slovakia asked the German Foreign 
Ministry for the number of deported Jews from Slovakia. The answer was 57,628 
people.52 According to the Hungarian ambassador in Bratislava, Lajos Kuhl 60,000 
people were deported from Slovakia.53 Those who remained at home survived for 
the time being, in which also Jozef Tiso played a role.54 In September 1942, Tuka 
and German ambassador Hans Elard Ludin with the sub-committees under their 
supervision started talks on the Jews, which lasted for ten days. The two sides 
agreed that Slovakia would pay 500 Reichsmarks to Germany as reimbursement 
after each deported person.55 Interestingly, only Croatia paid for the deportations 
in Europe but only 30 Reichsmarks per head.56 The justification of these quotas 
was that the state would have to care for the Jews if they had not been deported, 
and also that the Slovaks obtained great Jewish wealth due to the Aryanisation. 
This wealth was distributed among those who participated in the deportations or 
those who were considered worthy of it, especially people close to the Hlinka 
Guard. Ludin calmed Tuka, when the latter was worried about the solution of 
the Jewish question, that he was also dedicated to the complete solution of the 
problem in Slovakia.57
The pace of the deportations slowed down by early September 1942, then it 
came to a halt since nearly all without exemption were taken away.58 Those who 
52  SNA, Ministerstvo vnútra, Number 152, Box 262, 2361/42.
53  MNL, KÜM, K-63, 1943/65. tétel, 147/pol. 4th August 1943.
54  Tiso gave immunity to 5,000–9,000 Jewish people (their exact number is unknown). 
The documents were issued by the Presidential Office, which demanded high sums for the 
protection depending on the economic status of the applicant.
55  There is a memorandum without date among the documents of the Slovak Foreign Ministry, 
probably written at the end of 1943, which says that the 500 Reichsmark can be reduced 
to 300 as the Slovak National Bank transferred 200 million Slovak Crowns (converted to 
Reichsmark) to Germany in December 1943. SNA, Ministerstva vnútra, Box 262, 12683/42, 
see also: SNA, MZV, Box 142, No. 1.
56  NIŽNANSKÝ, Nacizmus, p. 231.
57  SNA, documents of people’s court (the documents of ambassador Ludin) No. 49/45, Box 22.
58  The stop of the deportations in Slovakia can be explained with several reasons. According 
to one version the Slovak leaders wanted to seek the new “Jewish settlements in the East”, 
which could have provided evidence for what was happening there. The other reason was the 
pressure from the Vatican and also the fact that the Slovakian Jewish leaders managed to bribe 
a few high-rank Hlinka Guard persons and also Dieter Wisliceny, who was in charge with the 
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remained at home were, about 20,000 people, were put into previously built “Jewish 
labour camps” or they were allowed to continue their work with their exemption 
document. The labour camps functioned until the Slovak National Uprising on 
29th August 1944. Most of the Jews participated in the uprising. The German 
army leadership reported that the Jews played an essential role in the revolt, and 
therefore they must be deported. This was evidence for Heinrich Himmler for the 
fact that where Jews were allowed to remain at home, there would be an uprising. 
Therefore he himself travelled to Bratislava to get the Slovak leaders to deport the 
Jews immediately.59 After the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising, the German 
SS units gathered the Jews and put them into concentration camps. Their estimated 
number is 13,000. All in all, the human loss of the Slovakian Jewish population was 
around 70,000 in 1942–1944.60
It must be noted that the anti-Jewish laws and the deportations were the work 
of the Slovak government and authorities. They did not even attempt to delay the 
process. As it can be seen above, the Tiso government loyally followed the policy 
of Nazi Germany, which led to the most tragic chapter in the modern history of 
Slovakia.61
Esterházy’s Voting Against the Jewish Law
János Esterházy was the only member of the Slovak parliament to vote against the 
Jewish law on 15th May 1942.62 He said to the Speaker of the House Martin Sokol 
that he would vote against the deportations and he hoped that he could convince his 
deportations. The latter turned out to have taken the money; still, it was not his intervention 
that stopped the deportations. BRAHAM, p. 371.
59  HRADSKÁ, pp. 70–71.
60  39,000 Jews were deported from the territories ceded to Hungary due to the Vienna 
Award between May and June 1944. From the 136,000 Jews who lived in the territory of 
today’s Slovakia about 108,000 were deported. J. ŠPITZER, Kétség és remény. Esszék és 
tanulmányok, Bratislava 1994, p. 11.
61  KOVÁČ, pp. 219–220.
62  The evaluation of the role of Esterházy usually shows a sharp contrast in Slovak and 
Hungarian historical literatue. The Slovaks label him a collaborator, while the Hungarians 
portray him as the critic of totalitarian arrangements and they write about him with recognition. 
His speeches clearly put Esterházy to the political opposition.
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fellow MPs to follow his example and perhaps the question would even be dropped 
from the agenda or at least postponed. Esterházy gave this reason to Sokol, and 
others, for his vote: “[...] I have had anti-Semitic bias since I was very young, and 
I will retain them, but it does not mean that I will give my vote to a law that treads on 
all divine and human rights. With the deportations the Slovaks do not deport the Jews 
as people of Israelite religion but the Jews as a race, which confirms my decision to 
vote against it. Hungarians form a national minority in Slovakia, and therefore it is 
entirely impossible for them to accept and identify with any bills which enable the 
majority to relocate a minority. We Hungarians have evidently lived and acted in 
the spirit of St Stephen for more a thousand years; the best evidence for it is the fact 
that no individual nor any group has been expelled from the territory of Hungary.”63 
Esterházy’s critics pointed this out to show that he had anti-Semitic sentiments. We 
have to feel the atmosphere of the age and see that Esterházy could not write that 
“I have always been the friend of the Jews” when everyone who tried to help them or 
expressed sympathy was punished. Such a declaration would have led to his immediate 
condemnation and it would not have convinced anyone that the bill was harmful. 
Those at power expected him to make statements that they could approve. Esterházy 
misled his opponents with his statements because he had to avoid any accusation of 
sympathising with the Jews. Therefore, his statement is irrelevant when we want to 
evaluate his behaviour. His intention was to make the Slovak government realise 
that even anti-Semitism cannot provide grounds for passing the law. He emphasised 
that the government had taken a dangerous path as it had, in fact, recognised that the 
minorities could simply be thrown out of the country.64 Esterházy deeply condemned 
the passing of the anti-Jewish law: “It is a shameful thing that a government whose 
head calls himself a good Catholic deports its Jewish population to Germany, to 
Hitler’s concentration camps. And it is also shameful that the same government sets 
up concentration camps in Slovakia, where Jews and Czech are kept without any 
legal procedure.”65 He was driven by his Catholic faith, his social sensitivity and his 
63  I. MOLNÁR, Esterházy János és a kisebbségi kérdés, Budapest 2000, pp. 215–216.
64  Ibidem.
65  ESTERHÁZY, p. 125.
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Hungarian minority consciousness when he rejected the bill. He was a man of solid 
morals who would not give up his values. He regarded his life and act as a mission 
to defend the interests of the Hungarians who remained in Slovakia, and to help the 
prosecuted people including the Jews.
The Slovak parliament voted with hand-raising those days. Counter-verification 
was held only when a proposal did not get visible majority. Now, everybody could 
see that Esterházy did not raise his hand. As there was no counter-verification, he left 
the hall in protest. The Slovak parliament did not want him to express his opinion 
in speech at the “no” voting. It is also noteworthy that a few Slovak MP had left the 
hall before the voting; allegedly, they did not want to vote. They went to the lavatory 
or the café; most of them belonged to the group around Pavol Čarnogurský.66 This is 
difficult to prove, now, as there is no written record of it. Kálmán Kéri was present 
in the assembly hall as a representative of Hungary. He mentioned that there was 
shouting and disorder when Esterházy left the hall and Sokol could make order with 
great difficulty.67
Rezső Peéry, a Hungarian writer in Slovakia, wrote about Esterházy’s step: 
“with courage still unparalleled in the parliamentary practice of totalitarian systems, 
as opposed to the humble yes from every other member of the house”, only the hand 
of János Esterházy did not rise.68 Rezső Szalatnay, Slovakian Hungarian literary 
historian, remembered with these words: “I saw, I heard when he did not vote for the 
Jewish law in the great hall of the former county building, now the building of the 
assembly, bravely protesting against opening the gate widely for inhumanity, which 
did happen later in the country. I saw when he said no to ministers and Hitler’s 
Slovakian procurator Franz Karmasin,69 who was the leader of the Slovakian 
66  O. PODOLEC, Slovensko-maďarské konflikty a ich odraz na pôde slovenského snemu, 
in: M. ŠTEFANSKÝ – I. PURDEK (ed.), Slovensko vo vojnách a v konfliktoch v 20 storočí. 
Zborník referátov z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 15.–16. októbra 2002, Bratislava 2003, 
p. 190. Also see KAMENEC – PREČAN – ŠKORVÁNEK, p. 112.
67  MOLNÁR, Sem gyűlölettel, p. 179.
68  R. PEÉRY, Malomkövek között. Találkozások kortársakkal, Feljegyzések, beszámolók, 
karcolatok, Stuttgart 1977, p. 54.
69  There was a tension between Franz Karmasin and Esterházy primarily due to the Germans 
in the Zips region, who supported the Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party) rather than the Nazi 
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Germans, and who hated him and would destroy him together with his party.”70 The 
Gardista, the mouthpiece of the Hlinka Guard remarked: “... all members voted with 
one exception.”71 The Gardista also wrote that rumour had already circulated among 
Slovak MPs that Esterházy would not vote for the deportation of the Jews. Guard 
members from Nitra went to the editorial office, as they had won a bet, having said 
that Esterházy would not give his vote to the deportation bill.72 Esterházy’s act was, 
under the given circumstances, the demonstration of opposition to the then victorious 
Nazi ideology and the policy of Adolf Hitler. It is his merit that he set an example to 
his contemporaries as well as to posterity.
Esterházy described the event to his family on the following day: “It was 
disgusting.73 The national assembly has sentenced the Jews here to deportation. And 
the most horrible thing was that the hall was full of priests.74 They were also afraid 
of Hitler’s revenge, and therefore voted for this terrible bill. This is how deep Hitler’s 
regime could bring the leaders of small nations, and even the priests; all this from the 
fear that Slovakia might share the fate of Poland.”75 According to the memories of 
Lujza Esterházy there were Wehrmacht officers in Bratislava who admired Esterházy’s 
behaviour. They said that he was “the bravest man in Central Europe”.76 However, 
German propaganda, just like the Slovakian press, condemned his act. The Grenzbote 
in Bratislava reported the event with this mocking title: “Only the lord Count did not 
vote for it!”77 The Gardista went even further. It did not label Esterházy’s behaviour 
a “protest”, domestic or international; rather, it called it such Jewish-friendly attitude 
in which he had personal interest as his estates were administered by Jews.78
oriented Deutsche Partei.
70  E. STELCZER, Esterházy János élete és munkássága, in: Kapu, 5, 8,1992, p. 47.
71  Gardista, May 17, 1942, p. 3.
72  Ibidem.
73  ESTERHÁZY, p. 122.
74  There were a lot of priests among the members of the Slovakian People’s Party.
75  ESTERHÁZY, p. 122.
76  I. EDELSHEIM Gyulai, Becsület és kötelesség. 1. kötet 1918–1944, Vol. 1, Budapest 2000, 
pp. 108–109.
77  Grenzbote (Pozsony), May 19, 1942, pp. 1–2.




The Gestapo and the Slovakian police suggested the arrest of Esterházy 
because of his vote, but the German Ambassador rejected the idea. His arrest 
would have elicited a huge diplomatic and political scandal between Slovakia and 
Hungary, which neither country wanted to risk. The Germans knew how popular 
Esterházy was in Hungary and they were afraid that his arrest would kindle anti-
German sentiments. Esterházy’s Jewish-friendly activity became inconvenient for 
the Hungarian government as well, and therefore, on German pressure, Premier 
László Bárdossy had to forbid the count to act or mediate in the interest of the Jews.79 
This did not prevent Esterházy from continuing his activity in secret. His daughter, 
Alice remembered his father bringing a suitcase full of passports from Hungary one 
day and distributing them among Jews and other refugees.80
The Interpretation of Esterházy’s Vote in Slovak Historiography
No one followed Esterházy’s example in the Slovak parliament. Unfortunately, his 
role and his act receive negative judgement from a part of Slovak historians. The main 
work of this trend was written by Ladislav Deák, who has recently passed away, which 
established an approach that still dominates the viewpoint of most Slovak historians.81 
According to Deák, Esterházy voted against the bill because Jews were defined by 
birth rather than religion, and so he felt the Slovakian Hungarians threatened. Deák’s 
other argument was that Esterházy had known, as early as 1942, that Hungary would 
lose the war on the side of Germany, and he wanted to collect credits for the post-
war period.82 Most Slovak historians think that Esterházy was seeking some alibi at 
the voting.83 Ivan Kamenec, among others, reproach Esterházy with accepting the 
previous anti-Jewish laws in parliament and with actively participating in Slovakian 
legislation, which made him responsible. He says that Esterházy acted in self-defence 
as he was afraid that the Slovakian Hungarians would follow the Jews in deportation. 
79  MOLNÁR, Esterházy János (1901–1957), p. 190.
80  MOLNÁR, Sem gyűlölettel, p. 217.
81  L. DEÁK, Politický profil Jánosa Esterházyho, Bratislava 1996.
82  Ibidem, pp. 17–19.
83  According to Ivan Kamened Esterházy was forced by circumstances and motivated by 
alibism when he gave his vote. I. KAMENEC, Po stopách tragédie, Bratislava 1991, p. 189.
István Janek
The Mediating Activity of János Esterházy between the Governments of Slovakia and 
Hungary in 1939–1942 with Specific Regard to the Jewish Question
92
Kamenec also points out the alibi issue.84 In the Slovakian view, Esterházy wanted to 
provide an excuse for himself against later accusations.
There are various approaches to Esterházy within Slovakian historiography. 
Ondrej Podolec concludes that he was the only one to have the courage to go against 
the Slovak parliament.85 He also points out, however, that Esterházy did not avoid 
anti-Jewish phrases in his report that he handed over to Sokol.86
Ján Mitáč, a young Slovak historian considers Esterházy’s vote mere 
alibism, since the count had previously voted for anti-Jewish laws; moreover, he 
lost the chance to be called the defender of democracy and human rights without 
regards to racial differences because he, then Czechoslovak MP, had ceded 
Kosice and participated in the destruction of the country in 1938.87 Ján Mitáč 
acknowledges Esterházy’s act in parliament, but he notes that “it was a very 
strong moral gesture without weight at the time, for Esterházy had supported 
all Jewish laws before.” Mitác states that Esterházy’s behaviour can only be 
interpreted as treason, even considering the fact that “his aristocratic morals did 
not allow him to raise his hand in support of a dirty law that deprived the Jews 
of all political rights”.88
Martin Lacko is another young historian of the generation who says that, 
regardless to activity and motive, Esterházy’s step betrays “great personal courage”. 
He also reproaches the contemporary Slovak politicians with having no other figure 
in a Christian state who would openly condemn the deportations.89 Martin Lacko 
gives the names of other three MPs who were not present in the assembly hall at the 
voting.90 He, also, does not absolve Esterházy.
84  Ibidem.
85  O. PODOLEC, Slovensko–maďarské konflikty a ich odraz na pôde slovenského snemu, 
in: M. ŠTEFANSKÝ – I. PURDEK (ed.), Slovensko vo vojnách a v konfliktoch v 20 storočí. 
Zborník referátov z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 15.–16. októbra 2002, Bratislava 2003, p. 190.
86  Ibidem, p. 191.
87  J. MITÁČ, Kauza Jánosa Esterházyho pohlad sloveského a maďarského historika. János 
Esterházy a jeho miesto v sloveských dejinách, in: Historická revue, 2, 2012, pp. 41–42.
88  Ibidem.
89  M. LACKO, Sloveská Republika 1939–1945, Bratislava 2008, pp. 73, 78.




The great gap between the official Slovak and Hungarian viewpoints is well 
demonstrated by the declaration of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Scientific 
Academy in 2011, which speaks about Esterházy in a negative context.91 They 
recognise the count’s voting against the deportations but reproach him with having 
accepted all the other anti-Jewish laws earlier and with participating in the construction 
of a totalitarian regime as an MP. His moral gesture of standing by the Jews must be 
evaluated, and his tragic fate later must be regarded with sympathy but this cannot 
provide fundamental criteria for the evaluation of his political activity as a whole.92
Let us note the dismal fact that the Slovakian MPs lacked the courage to openly 
follow the example of the count. If only there had been more “alibist” representative 
in the Slovak parliament who would have dared to act. Esterházy’s vote meant 
opposition to collective judgement. Speculations on the motivation of his “no” vote, 
statements about necessity or “alibism” are merely interpretations of historians in 
retrospect, which do not dim the fact that he acted.
Esterházy’s Activity to Save Jews
Esterházy also took concrete steps to help the prosecuted Jews. He managed to get 
the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer to allow the Jews 
who escaped to Hungary from Slovakia to remain there without harassment, and that 
those without passport or visa could receive asylum in Hungary.93 He did everything 
so that the Jews in Slovakia could escape to Hungary. We know this from the wife 
of István Horthy, Ilona Edelsheim.94 The statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of the 
91  Based on former Slovak analyses it considered the Hungarian interpretation that Esterházy 
“was the persevering warrior not only of the Hungarian minority here but also a determined 
democrat and humanist, the unselfish protector of persecuted citizens and the unappreciated 
supporter of the Slovak-Hungarian friendship and cooperation” false and mistaken. In their 
view, all this was in contrast with historical facts. They think that Esterházy had endeavoured 
to shatter the democratic system of the Czechoslovak Republic. This was the target of his 
undermining activity and intelligence work in cooperation not only with Budapest but also 
with the Nazis. See the whole text at: http://www.history.sav.sk/esterhazy.htm.
92  Ibidem.
93  EDELSHEIM, p. 108.
94  Ibidem.
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Interior show more than 20,000 Jews who left Slovakia for Hungary.95 This may be an 
exaggerated number, but to tell the exact number of the fugitive Jews would require 
the complete examination of documents. A contemporary Slovakian source estimates 
their number 10,000, which is possibly closer to reality.96 The Slovak administration 
did not approve of the steps of Keresztes-Fischer and Esterházy.97 The Ministry 
of the Interior in Bratislava sent a complaining note to the Slovak Foreign 
Ministry on 26 June 1942, and they asked for the immediate intervention of the 
minister at the Hungarian embassy demanding the prevention of illegal Jewish 
migration to Hungary.98 The Hungarian government did not pay much attention 
to the Slovak protest at first, but later they made the border-guard control 
stricter when the German embassy in Budapest also demanded it emphatically. 
However, the life of Jews was not threatened in Hungary until the German 
occupation.
There were politicians in Slovakia who wanted to find a common solution 
to the Hungarian and the Jewish question. Franz Karmasin, the leader of Slovakian 
Germans was such a figure, who not only hindered the settlement of Slovak-Hungarian 
relations, but also wanted to expel all Jews, Roma, Hungarians and other unwanted 
people, claiming them inferior races, in order to settle 100,000 German families to 
their place.99 
Esterházy must have been familiar with what happened to the Jews in 
Poland as he had relatives there and he also visited the country. The memories 
of Lujza Esterházy tell us about this. The countess visited Minister of the 
95  M. KÁLLAY, Magyarország miniszterelnök voltam 1942–1944. Egy nemzet küzdelme 
a második világháborúban, Vol. II, Budapest 1991, pp. 79–80. Ivan Kamenec and his fellow 
researchers estimate the number of Jews who fled to Hungary in 1942 at 5–6,000. KAMENEC 
– PREČAN – ŠKORVÁNEK, p. 98.
96  SNA, documents of the people’s court, Number 45, Box 97, Film archive I. A-1010, 198/97.
97  At the end of May 1942, Mach asked Ján Spišiak to ask the Hungarian government to send 
back Jews with Slovak citizenship until July 1942 otherwise they would lose their Slovakian 
citizenship. Spišiak also had to ask what was to be done with the Jews with Hungarian 
citizenship who were still in Slovak territory. Would they be also deported or sent to Hungary? 
See: E. NIŽŇANSKÝ, Holokaust na Slovensku. 6. Deportácie v roku 1942, Zvolen 2005, p. 213.
98  SNA, MZV. Box 142, No. 1300/42.
99  Z. BALASSA, Pilóta a viharban. Gróf Esterházy János és kora, Budapest 1994, pp. 75–76.
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Interior Mach and asked him for assistance for a deported Jewish man who had 
“presidential immunity”. After long telephone talks, Mach found out that he 
could not do anything as the man had been transported to Germany. “But Mr 
Minister, this deportation happened without your permission,” she said. “Save 
this man from the death camp for God’s sake!” Mach denied the existence of 
death camps and asked where Lujza Esterházy had such information from. The 
countess told him that she knew that Jews were executed in the camps. Mach 
replied resentfully: “[...] We are surely no butchers, are we? We would never 
have allowed the deportation of the Jews knowing that they go to death! No 
doubt, we wanted to get rid of them but only on condition that they leave for 
Palestine. They have to remain in the camp of the Reich only until the end of 
the war. We would never agree to their execution.” “I believe that you do not 
know about their extermination in Nazi camps,” she responded. “The Gestapo 
probably did not confess it to you. But all who have been to German-occupied 
Poland, like myself, know for sure that the Jews are getting to death camps.” 
“You are probably a victim of the anti-Hitlerist propaganda of the London 
radio,” Mach declared,100 when the countess replied that Mach was the victim 
of Nazi propaganda. At the end, Mach promised to get her protégé back from 
Auschwitz in a few days. He never fulfilled his promise.
Esterházy’s Jew-saving activity did not only mean his “no”-vote; there is 
evidence that he also saved concrete families and persons. Felix Schlesinger and his 
wife Katalin Weithamer, who had leased the Esterházy estate before, testified this 
at the end of the war. Esterházy helped them to escape to Budapest where he got 
them a flat as well. They said in their testimony: “... we know that he helped several 
Jewish people in the Central Office in Budapest, who were then not deported by the 
Germans. He saved several Jews from their camps.”101
Ágnes Wertheinger was hiding in Újlak before she and her parents could 
get to Hungary with Esterházy’s help. Ágnes confirms that there were others who 
100  ESTERHÁZY, pp. 126–127.
101  SNA, Národný súd 19/47, mikrofilm II. A 951. Zapisnica 1948, 31st May.
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received passports and went to Hungary.102 Others were hiding in Esterházy’s palace 
or nearby. Veronika Dubnická Schlesingerova and her family were such people.103 
On one occasion, Esterházy saved 200 Jewish people on labour service when he 
dissuaded their commander from sending them abroad saying that there was a lot of 
work to do at home. He gave the men clothes and food; staying in Slovakia, under 
better circumstances saved their lives.104 Esterházy also helped Viktor Egri novelist, 
Dr Árpád Balogh-Dénes solicitor, “Uncle Lővy” one of the owners of the printing 
house in Nitra as well as Dr Hőnigberg physician and his family, whose daughter he 
saved from the Budapest ghetto in 1944.105
It was also Esterházy who organised the saving of 1000 Israelites who were 
christened by Calvinist ministers István Puskás from Zólyom (Zvolen), László Sedivy 
from Nitra and Sándor Brányik from Eperjes (Prešov). With their conversion, they 
could avoid the most severe regulations of the Jewish laws. The former two ministers 
were arrested by the Slovakian police in 1942; they were taken to the prison of Illava, 
from where they were released by the instrumentality of Esterházy.106
It must be noted that Magyar Hírlap, the official paper of the Hungarian 
Party (Magyar Párt), supervised by Esterházy, dealt with the Jewish question only 
occasionally in 1942–1944. It published the reports and news of the Slovakian 
Agency on the matter without comments. There were no personal voices or offensive 
articles. Esterházy did not make rude or condemnable anti-Jewish remarks in his 
articles although he could have turned them to his advantage. The Hungarian Party 
helped its Jewish members until 1944; the Hungarian identity card meant protection 
against deportation for a while. We know that members received regular benefit. One 
such occasion was when Dr Marcell Szilárd, who had lost his job as a lawyer due to 
his origin in Bratislava in 1940, received 5,500 Crowns per month from the party.107 
Esterházy, when instructed to renew his staff by the Slovak authorities in 1942, did not 
102  The letter of Ágnes Wertheimer to Elemér Stelczer. In: ESTERHÁZY-MALFATTI, p. 215.
103  On the hiding of the Jews of Nyitraújlak see: ESTERHÁZY, p. 135.
104  MOLNÁR, Sem gyűlölettel, p. 182.
105  Ibidem, p. 184.
106  Ibidem.
107  Ibidem, p. 181. 
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submit the data of the members of the Hungarian Party, and he continued accepting 
Germans and Jews in the party rather than excluding them.108 “I will not exclude as 
Jews those who have been good Hungarians from one day to the other,” he said.109 
The leaders of the Hungarian Party had two lists of members: one for the authorities 
and one for themselves with the real data.110 On the call of Esterházy the Hungarian 
Party and the Slovakian Hungarians rejected participation in Aryanization; with 
a few exceptional cases, they did not collectively contribute to the robbery of the 
Jews. Eleven Slovakian Hungarians seized significant Jewish wealth, and even they 
acted according to their previous agreement with the former Jewish owner.111
Now the question can be raised if Esterházy was anti-Semitic? It is not easy 
to answer; he probably shared the prejudices of his age. However, he disagreed with 
race theory and rejected it several times.112 Irén Rujder, who survived the holocaust 
and who was saved by Esterházy, gives the answer: “In the forties, everybody knew 
in Bratislava that Esterházy was a friend of the Jews, so much so that he was mocked 
as a Jew several times. He was also threatened with deportation; still, he helped 
as he could. […] János Esterházy does not deserve the slanders written about him 
these days. We, who lived in Slovakia at that time, know the truth. He was handed 
over to the Soviets because if he had been tried in Bratislava, every Jew would have 
witnessed for him. Such a corruption of truth is painful. Esterházy really deserves 
a tree of the Righteous in Israel. […] I cannot name another person who would have 
done so much for the Jews as he did. His whole family was noted for their willingness 
108  M. ÁDÁM, Esterházy János koncepciós pere, 1947-ben, in: História, 8, 2008, p. 14; 
HETÉNYI, p. 123; Molnár, Sem gyűlölettel, p. 140.
109  G. SZENT-IVÁNYI, Graf János Esterházy, Wien 1995, p. 183.
110  HETÉNYI, pp. 234–235.
111  R. SZALATNAI, A csehszlovákiai magyarok 1938 és 1945 között. Part II, in: Regio 
1990/3, p. 178.
112  One of many examples: Esterházy, as the president of the Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party) 
forbade in a letter to organise a Fascist department in the party. In 1944-1945, he did all he 
could to prevent his party from serving German or Arrow Cross interests. The best example is 
perhaps the description of a contemporary, Rezső Peéry: “Who would not become Germans 
or join the Guard, who were hiding from the Fascist present and the world in the community 
whose only noticeable and outstanding characteristic was the rejection of National Socialism.” 
R. PEÉRY, Védőbeszéd a szlovákiai magyarok perében, Bratislava 1993, p. 66.
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to help. It was not only we whom he helped; I know that he gave Hungarian passports 
to many in order to save them.”113
Esterházy, like others, was not born to save humans. One has to take a long 
road before, shaped by circumstances and events, one takes to save lives. The 
evaluation of the historical role of Esterházy is not problematic on the Hungarian 
side but on the Slovak side it is still debated. His role in the Jewish problem, however, 
is beyond dispute. By refusing to vote for the deportations he clearly stood on their 
side. Slovakian history writing acknowledges that Esterházy had the courage to 
protest against the holocaust at the highest level in one of the darkest periods of 
twentieth-century Slovakia. By voting against the proposal he confronted the German 
Reich; he turned against Nazism alone. As a contemporary witness remembered: 
“I experienced the holocaust. Therefore, I know how much the smallest support 
means, and Count János Esterházy not only helped the Jews but he stood by them in 
the most difficult days when they were facing death.”114 Still, his Jew-saving activity 
was not considered when he was put to trial and sentenced in Czechoslovakia in 
1947. It should have been taken into account according to the contemporary Slovak 
law but the submitted documents were not approved.115 Esterházy’s trial took place 
in his absence; he was sentenced without being heard. His conviction was unjust and 
improportionate; he was sentenced to death at first, then to life-long imprisonment. 
Finally, he died in prison.116 Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, who was the 
mouthpiece of the deportation of Slovakian Jews was first sentenced to death then 25 
years in prison and finally he was given amnesty.
113  ESTERHÁZY-MALFATTI, p. 214.
114  The letter of the historian M. ÁDÁM, in: Ki volt Esterházy János?, Budapest 2007, p. 10.
115  B. DOLEŽAL, Esterházy János esete, in: Valóság, 12, 1995, p. 83.
116  Esterházy was sentenced in Czechoslovakia with reference to the decree of the Slovak 
National Council on people’s court. Esterházy was accused of making an agreement, as the 
president of the United Hungarian Party (Egyesült Magyar Párt), with the Sudeten German and 
the Hlinka parties in February 1938 to set demands for the Czechoslovak Republic which could 
make it fall apart. By doing so he actively contributed to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
and to the destruction of its democratic order. With being the president of the Hungarian 
Party and an MP in the Slovak parliament, he identified with the German orientation and he 
supported the “activity of the Fascist invaders and their collaborators”, which deserves death 
penalty. SNA, Národný súd, 19/47. Mikrofilm II. A 951. János Esterházy. Dok. 19/47/10.
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Perhaps if Esterházy was approached from another aspect: his behaviour in the 
Jewish question, it could be the initial step towards his rehabilitation, and it could be 
a gesture in disclosing the common past.
Abstract
The purpose of this study is the introduction of the mediation of János Esterházy in 
the bilateral relations of Slovakia and Hungary mentioning only a few examples due 
to limitations in length. In the second part of the study, the activity of Esterházy in 
the Jewish question is discussed; the reasons behind his voting against the Jewish 
law. János Esterházy considered it his main goal to forge the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia together, and he imagined the life of the community in the form of a great 
family. The person of Esterházy is interpreted in different ways in the Slovak and 
Hungarian history writing. This study wishes to present these interpretations based 
on facts and to get them closer to each other. 
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